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Abstract
We investigate three aspects of the supposed problem of time: The
disagreement between the treatments of time in general relativity and
quantum theory, the problem of recovering time from within an iso-
lated Universe and the prevalence of a unidirectional time flow (i.e.,
the so-called arrow of time). Under our interpretation, general relativ-
ity and quantum theory have complementary time treatments given
that they emerge from a theory of a more fundamental nature. To
model an isolated Universe, we use the Wheeler-DeWitt equation and
then apply the Page-Wootters method of recovering time. It is ar-
gued that, if the recovery of an experience of time is indeed viable
in this framework, interactions and quantum entanglement are both
essential features, even though the former is normally an afterthought
or altogether dismissed. As for the one-way arrow of time, this is,
from our perspective, a consequence of including the aforementioned
interactions. But underlying our interpretation, and pretty much all
others, is the necessity for causality. It is this fundamental tenet which
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accounts for our experience of time but yet can only be postulated.
Our conclusion is that the ‘problem of causality’ is what should be the
focal point of future investigations.
1 Introduction
The supposed ‘problem of time’ is an ongoing discussion in both physics and
philosophy. Many different questions are raised under this encompassing
topic, leading to disagreement amongst the wide range of contributors. Part
of the trouble is the frequent use of buzzwords in lieu of clear-cut definitions.
In order to avoid this pitfall, we will attempt to define any term that is used
without relying on vague phrases. For examples of previous discussions on
this topic, see [1, 2, 3, 4].
While some of these previous discussion present compelling arguments,
there is no consensus as of yet. Pinning down a definition of time alone
is troublesome, as pointed out in [5], amongst others. We start then by
identifying what we believe to be the simplest possible definition of time, as
well as any associated ingredients that are required to recover our experience
of time. With these definitions in hand, we will assess three of the aspects of
the problem of time. These are, one, the difference in how time is treated in
quantum mechanics and general relativity, two, the phenomenon of a one-way
arrow of time and, three, the recovery of time in an isolated and therefore
timeless Universe.
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1.1 Time and our experience of it
Time The task of defining time presents one with a problem since it cannot
be accessed directly. As with space, our knowledge of time comes about from
studying the behavior of physical objects rather than directly measuring time
(or space) itself. Since the main interest here is in describing the experience
of time, we will avoid the debate about the potential existence of time and
space as independent entities but, rather, focus on describing time as it affects
physical systems. (But for a summary of this debate, see, e.g., [6].) We do
note that the physical existence of an extended object — even for one that
is not moving — would seem to imply that space is required to provide a
physical meaning to the spatial dimensions of the object. 1 If this is true,
one might argue, by extension, that time should likewise be required, a point
which will be elaborated on later.
To ensure that any features which are necessary for the experience of time
do not become hidden assumptions, we begin with a very basic observation:
The experience of time is one of change. In particular, we regard the ‘con-
figuration’ as the feature of a physical system that undergoes change. By
configuration, we really mean the state — which is defined by all the prop-
erties that the system might have at any given moment — but have tweaked
the terminology as a reminder that the Schro¨dinger picture is then assumed
for the quantum case. Given a physical system, which can be constructed
from one or more parts, ‘change’ indicates the process by which the system
1As definitions of existence can lead to many philosophical issues, we will rely here on a
notion of ‘physical being’ that is similar to the Parmenidean view of ‘what is’ as described
in, for example, [7]. More nuanced definitions can be found in, for example, [8].
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transitions from any one configuration to another. For example, two config-
urations of a cup could be ‘in midair’ and ‘scattered in pieces on the floor’ .
The continual change in a system’s configuration leads to the experience of
time but, as of yet, there is no compelling reason to insist that the config-
uration of any system must change. The implication is that the most basic
definition of time lacks such a feature. With that said, it is important to
distinguish between two related but still different situations where a system
does not change:
On one hand, a system may have no functional dependence on time and
therefore remains in the same configuration regardless of the value of the
time coordinate. 2 Such a system is normally said to be static; while it might
exist in multiple moments of time, its configuration is the same in all. A
stationary system would also fit this bill given that the transitions between
configurations have been suitably coarse grained. On the other hand, a
system with access to only one moment of time would also be incapable of
change since it would have no secondary moment to ‘move’ into. We will
call such a system ‘frozen’ to capture the idea that it is stuck in the one
moment it happens to occupy. It could be argued that a frozen system can
be functionally dependent on time as its configuration may depend on being
stuck in this particular moment instead of that one. A ‘frozen’ system could
then be considered to be a priori capable of change, which it would experience
2The debate over whether time has independent existence often separates ‘time’ as a
thing-in-itself from ‘coordinate time’ as a relational concept which relates physical systems.
For a summary of the difference, see, for example, [6]. The discussion presented here,
however, is not concerned with this debate and so no such distinction of coordinate time
from ‘independent’ time is made.
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if it had access to more than one moment of time and was compelled to ‘move’
to a second moment. But, lacking these attributes, a frozen system, just like
a static system, is unable to evolve. 3
But, on still another hand, one might ask if a non-evolving system needs
to to rely on time at all in order to exist. In other words, could an existent
system have no opportunity for change as a strict matter of principle? If it
could, this would provide us with a third distinguishable situation. Neverthe-
less, a compelling argument for the necessity of time in describing physical
existence goes as follows: Since the configuration is what is affected as a sys-
tem moves through time, one can reasonably assume that the configuration
is what should be influenced by the removal of time. (However, see [6] for
a contrary opinion.) Then, without the notion of a moment to ensure that
a single configuration has been selected out of the many possibilities, the
system could be viewed as occupying any one of its configurations. But this
scenario is logically no different than claiming that the system is occupying
all possible configurations. We would then argue that such a situation de-
prives the system of its physical existence and conclude that time is indeed
necessary, regardless of any functional dependence on a parameter of time. 4
It is worth pointing out that depriving a system of the compulsion to
change tends to put time and space on more even ground. This is because a
basic definition of space might be that it is a feature of the Universe which
3 This view of frozen systems shares similarities with the Block (or timeless) Universe
perspective. The latter is discussed in Section 4 and Appendix B.
4This suggestion bears some similarity to the perdurantist view, a defense of which can
be found in [9]. There it is argued that any object necessarily has a temporal aspect which
must be taken into account, albeit with a different line of reasoning.
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allows movement to occur but does not include the compulsion to move.
Regardless of the impetus, whether it be the most basic definition of time
or its unification with space, we will similarly define time as a feature of the
Universe that allows change to occur but does not compel it. Given one’s own
understanding of the experience of time, this definition immediately begs the
question: what does provide the compulsion?
Causality We still need to account for the continual change from one con-
figuration to the next, and in a manner which is consistent with the expe-
rience of physical systems. The described process can be attributed to the
principle of causality which, in most discussions, is either formally postulated
or taken for granted to allow for an interpretation of physical theories. 5 Since
the meaning of causality has many different variations, let us first clarify the
definition to be used here. What we have in mind is similar to the viewpoint
of [10], which talks in terms of ‘interventions’ acting on systems to induce
change. More to the point, causality will be taken to represent a process by
which an external influence, the cause, compels a system to transition from
one configuration to a different configuration, the effect. 6 Because one of
the configurations is a consequence of the transitioning of the other, there
is a natural precedence for the configurations, but this is not an inherently
5We recognize that the status of causality is a contentious issue in the philosophy of
physics and do not claim to present a proof of the principle. Rather, we are acknowledging
causality’s role in our current descriptions of the experience of time even as an ad hoc
principle.
6As pointed out in [10], this suggests that causality cannot have meaning for a closed
system for which there can be no outside influence. This concern will be addressed in
Section 4.
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temporal ordering until causality is combined with a suitable definition of
time, like the one above. Once this step is taken, the ordering in time can
be set so that the cause always precedes the event. A series of configurations
which are strung together with the requisite ordering provides the desired
picture of a system moving through time. This closely resembles the account
of time as a process of ‘becoming’, which was historically first suggested by
Heraclitus in ancient Greece and, more modernly, by (e.g.) Whitehead [11]
and Prigogine [12].
It should be stressed that this definition of causality does not implicitly
include any notion of determinism. Although determinism and causality are
often conflated, and many authors disagree that they can be separated, here
the distinction is maintained. The difference can be seen by considering
the case where a cause may have several possible effects, as is evident in
stochastic theories and, of course, in quantum mechanics. (See, e.g., [13] for
further elaboration.)
In spite of our claims about a causal ordering, the direction of the time
flow remains ambiguous. To understand why, let us to return to the example
of a falling cup. There, it is natural to identify gravity as the external
influence or cause and the transition from ‘in midair’ to ‘scattered in pieces on
the floor’ as the effect. This picture makes the ordering of the configurations
clear, but it is only natural because an observer would rarely (actually, never)
see the reverse ordering of configurations. As is well known, the equations of
motion in most physical theories are time-reversible invariant, and Newton’s
equations of motion are no exception. And it is just as well known that, with
the possible exception of the collapse the wavefunction, physics should not
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and does not require a conscious observer to operate. Meaning that one could
just as easily say that some unknown agent caused the plate to reassemble and
project upwards. Who is to say what is the correct interpretation? This same
logic can be extended to a chain of configurations: the sequence of the events
remains clear but the labels of ‘cause’ and ‘effect’ can be arbitrarily assigned
to either end of the chain. It then appears that time reversibility undermines
the utility of causality in determining relationships between configurations.
(This same observation is relevant to ‘timeless’ models of the Universe; see
Section 4.)
The discussion above does, however, overlook thermodynamics, which
identifies certain processes as being irreversible: those for which the entropy
has increased. In other words, the second law of thermodynamics, which
states that the entropy of a closed system can never decrease, enforces irre-
versibility and, with it, a unique direction in time. In the previous example,
it is quite clear that the smashing of the plates is just such an irreversible
process.
Before the thermodynamic argument can be accepted, there are (at least)
two counter-arguments to consider: thermodynamics is not a fundamental
theory, which makes it capable of hiding the intrinsic reversibility of physics,
and there is no obvious reason why this so-called thermodynamic arrow of
time should align itself with the cosmological time, which is taken to be the
time experienced by a (typically large) group of gravitationally bound sys-
tems as a whole. But it will later be counter-counter-argued that irreversible
processes are absolutely necessary if time is to emerge in an otherwise timeless
(or isolated) Universe and that these very same processes are what accounts
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for the direction of cosmological time. 7 And, because the time evolution
is itself emergent and not fundamental, it is no longer subject to the same
symmetry properties of the underlying theory.
1.2 The ‘problem of time’
To summarize the discussion so far: Time (by itself) allows systems to change,
causality compels them to change and, under the assumption of an isolated
Universe, irreversible processes pick out a unique direction for change to
occur in. Let us now return to the aforementioned three problems of time
and briefly preview our proposed resolutions.
Our first task will be to address the different treatments of time in quan-
tum mechanics and general relativity. As will be explained, there is reason to
believe that these two time treatments descend from a common theory. To
be clear, this common theory — for which the putative fundamental theory
is its antecedent — does not have to contain time as its normally understood;
a template will suffice. As for our reasoning, this is based on three obser-
vations: quantum mechanics is a descendant of quantum field theory, both
quantum field theory and general relativity have a spacetime metric, and the
Minkowski metric of quantum field theory should be regarded as a limiting
case of a generic class of metrics and not merely a background structure. The
very last claim will be shown to be a consequence of quantum field theory
having no global symmetries, and it means that there is fundamentally no
difference between the metrics — and therefore time parameters — of the
7The importance of irreversible processes in the context of time evolution has been ad-
vocated by others; for example, Prigogine [12] (also see [14, 15] for different perspectives).
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two theories in question. Here, we are not claiming to offer a conclusive
description of a ‘quantized time’ as it might appear in a theory of quantum
gravity. Rather, we are presenting evidence of similarities between the two
treatments of time, supporting the notion that they do in fact arise from a
more fundamental source.
Now what about the arrow of time? As already discussed, our resolu-
tion of the timeless Universe problem (see below) also provides a built-in
resolution to the arrow-of-time quandary, as it ensures that the cosmological
times and thermodynamic time are in alignment. The central point is that
the emergence of time requires irreversible processes as a matter of principle,
and these provide a natural direction for the time flow. There is, however,
another brand of time to consider; namely, psychological time. This typically
refers to time as it is experienced by conscious beings who have an innate
ability to remember the past but never the future. Although the argument
that directly connects psychological time to its thermodynamic counterpart
is well known (e.g., [16, 17]), we will summarize it here; both for the sake
of completeness and because similar reasoning is used later in the paper.
Briefly, the storage of a new memory first requires the erasure of an old one.
But the latter comes at the cost of an increase in entropy due to an associ-
ated loss of heat [18]. It is often pointed out, by way of analogy, that this
process is functionally no different than adding a new bit of information to
a computer. What will be important to us is that the same can be said
about any physical system that is capable of storing information, even if it
is inanimate. For further discussion, see Section 3.
The last of the three issues is also the most involved: The problem of
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providing time to the Universe if it is truly isolated. The Universe would
then have to be in a timeless state because, simply put, it already contains
‘everything’. The real point though is the conservation of energy, which
must be in effect for any closed system. For a closed system without gravity,
whether classical or quantum, one is then free to set the on-shell value of
the Hamiltonian to zero by adding a constant. If gravity is included, one
no longer has this freedom, but general relativity handles it automatically
through its constraint equations. And, deprived of a Hamiltonian (as far
as physical solutions of the field equations are concerned), time evolution
is impossible. To be clear, a particle in a well, for example, is in a static
state and not a timeless one, because time is still provided by its external
environment. But there can be no such environment to rely on when the
Universe exists in isolation. 8
The model of an isolated Universe is captured by the Wheeler–DeWitt
equation [19], which elevates general relativity into the quantum regime
(more accurately, into the realm of semiclassical physics). We are not claim-
ing (nor disputing) that this equation provides an accurate depiction of re-
ality, but it does exhibit the essential feature of timelessness. Page and
Wootters famously proposed a method of recovering time in the Wheeler–
DeWitt framework; the basic idea is to allow a subsystem of the Universe to
serve as a clock for the remainder [20]. The delineation of the subsystems is,
at first glance, arbitrary under the proviso that the systems are maximally
entangled (in the quantum sense) and weakly interacting. In subsequent
8Our discussion does not preclude parallel universes nor multiverse theories but instead
assumes that one member of such an ensemble cannot influence any other.
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descriptions of this method, the interactions are typically deactivated, at
least as a limiting case. Our own investigations led to the conclusion that
the interactions cannot be arbitrarily small and still allow for an adequate
description of time [21, 22]. Moreover, as one subsystem is effectively mea-
suring the other, the interactions are necessarily irreversible. And so what
we have is an emergent cosmological time with a built-in arrow of time that
automatically aligns with the thermodynamic arrow and then, vicariously,
with the psychological arrow. (Similar links between general relativity and
thermodynamics are touched upon in Section 4.)
What is still missing, however, is a mechanism that explains how either
of the two subsystems can transfer from one of their configurations into the
next. In other words, what is still lacking is an explanation of causality. Since
causality is, to the best of our knowledge, always introduced as a postulate, a
complete ‘theory of everything’ may be what is needed to pinpoint its origin.
In the meanwhile, our suggestion would be to change the focus of future
investigations from the problem of time to the mystery of causality, as it
is the latter that is ultimately responsible for the experience of time in the
Universe.
The remainder of the discourse is organized as follows: Section 2 presents
our argument that time in quantum mechanics and general relativity should
not be regarded as independent entities, and that their respective time treat-
ments can be traced to a common theory. Section 3 recalls how time can
emerge in an otherwise timeless Universe and then shows how the requisite
inclusion of interactions forms a link between the cosmological and thermo-
dynamic time arrows. Section 4 presents additional discussion regarding the
12
problem of time in the context of our findings and d conclusions. A support-
ing description of the Page–Wootters method is provided in Appendix A.
Several possible objections to our conclusions are discussed in Appendix B,
including the clock ambiguity [23], the Block Universe, and the inclusion of
other universes.
2 Time in quantum mechanics and general
relativity
The aim of this section is to reconcile the differing views of time which
arise in different theories of physics. Historically speaking, the first physical
definition of time appeared in Newtonian mechanics, and so we begin there.
Time in the classics
Time, as described by Newton, was an “absolute” quantity which existed
outside and independently of physical systems [24]. As such, it could not be
directly measured but only described as a relative quantity between events,
where an event represents a change in the configuration of system and is
quantified through the classical equations of motion. After establishing a
coordinate system, one can use these equations to assign each event with a
location in both space ~r and a time t. If different coordinate systems are
moving relative to one another at a constant speeds, each one can be viewed
as the reference frame for a co-moving observer. 9 Moreover, any two of
9Our use of terms such as ‘observer’ and ‘perspective’ should not be taken to imply
a conscious experimenter. We will be explicit whenever such an observer is required to
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these inertial frames can be related though a Galilean transformation of their
spatial coordinates. Note though that the time axes of two such reference
frames can never be moving relative to one another, as t applies globally to all
frames (up to an arbitrary choice for t = 0), making the difference between
time and space quite apparent. And so time in Newtonian mechanics, even
as a parameter describing relations between events, remains external to the
events. We will refer this parametrization as ‘external time’.
The external time t requires a further assumption if it is to describe dy-
namics. Since the external time exists outside of the physical arena, there is
no inherent motivation for a series of events to be ordered by, say, assigning
each with a particular value of t. This mathematical framework, at best,
only provides an elementary notion of time as already described in the in-
troductory section. The principle of causality is still required to motivate
a recognizable order for any series of events. Suppose that each configura-
tion of a system is represented as a frame from a film reel. Without causal
relationships, the frames may be shuffled into any arbitrary order without
contradicting the mathematical rules of Newtonian mechanics but also with-
out producing a recognizable description of reality. Only when causality is
enforced (or postulated) will the frames be restricted to a specific order. This
sequence accounts for the ‘moving’ from one configuration of the system to
another; what is better known as dynamics.
But, as was unknown to Newton, his mechanics emerges from special
relativity in the limit c → ∞ or, alternatively, from quantum mechanics
in the limit ~ → 0 , both of which are illustrated later in Figure 3. Of
make a point.
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course, these two theories are themselves limiting cases of theories that are
even more diverse in their scope. Meaning that external time and all its
trappings should be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism. With this in
mind, the discussion will advance further up the ‘ladder of fundamentally’,
starting with an examination of time in special relativity.
Time in the relativistic theories
If the Newtonian treatment of time is an artifact of its treatment in special
relativity, how does the more fundamental notion of time differ?
Many discussions on special relativity (e.g., Chapter 2 of [25]) begin with
the postulates that the laws of physics and the speed of light are the same
in all inertial reference frames. Using these requirements, one finds that a
pair of such frames can now be related by what are known as Lorentz trans-
formations. 10 These transformations are fundamentally different from the
Galilean transformations of Newtonian physics in that time and space can
both undergo transformations and can, indeed, even become mixed. To as-
sure that the laws of physics remain intact, physical quantities are required
to transform covariantly under Lorentz transformations. On this basis, one
can rather construct the theory of special relativity by enforcing Lorentz
covariance where appropriate. Importantly, there is a smaller class of quan-
tities that, just like the speed of light, must remain unchanged under Lorentz
transformations; these being the Lorentz invariants (typically scalar quan-
10Lorentz transformations are described by rotations in space and/or boosts (rotations in
four-dimensional Euclidean space). The complete set of transformations are the Poincare´
transformations, which also include translations.
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tities, but see below for a notable exception). As the set of all Lorentz
transformations forms a group, a Lorentz-invariant quantity is a textbook
example of a global symmetry.
An important example of a Lorentz-invariant scalar quantity is proper
time; this being the amount of elapsed time between two points in spacetime
as would be measured by a clock moving along a strictly timelike path (see
below for a definition). A path-independent way of measuring proper time
can be obtained by introducing the Minkowski metric tensor. Although not
a scalar, the Minkowski metric is yet another object that is invariant under
Lorentz transformations. It is also the uniquely coordinate-independent form
of a more general tensor. In general, given a spacetime manifold (flat or
otherwise), the associated metric tensor provides a means of measuring the
square of the ‘distance’ between any two points in the manifold; this being
the same, up to sign, as measuring the square of the proper time interval.
In discussions about spacetime geometry, the notions of space and time
can become blurred because of their aforementioned mixing transformations.
The proper time is one way of maintaining a distinction. Another, more
geometric way is provided by null cones; this being an object whose surface
is defined by the path of the light rays emanating from its apex. As light is the
fastest-moving object from any observer’s perspective, the null cone serves
as a means for delineating between timelike paths — those staying within
the null cone — and spacelike — those passing through its outer surface.
The boundary of the cone itself contains strictly null (lightlike) paths. For a
more graphic description, see Figure 1. It should also be kept in mind that
the notion and utility of both proper time and light cones persists for more
16
general spacetime geometries.
Figure 1: A schematic diagram of a null cone, whose outer surface describes
the path of light rays in spacetime.
It is clear that, at least in flat spacetime, the null cones identify just one
of the four spacetime dimensions as temporal. But time, as it is experienced
in Nature, is not included in this setup as long as the notion of causality is
absent. Same as for Newtonian physics, special relativity does not necessarily
produce recognizable dynamics. As per the previously described film analogy,
special relativity might allow for the frames to be fixed together but it fails,
on its own, to ensure that the sequence of frames will be arranged in any
particular order.
Special relativity is, of course, the weak-gravitational or GN → 0 limit of
its more fundamental description, the theory of general relativity. But trans-
lating between theories is much more involved than applying a simple limit.
For one thing, in the general theory, inertial reference frames are no longer
favored over their non-inertial (or accelerating) counterparts. For another, as
17
the effects of gravity are ‘turned on’, the spacetime geometry becomes curved
and, as a result, the metric tensor will no longer be expressible in a constant
form nor will it be invariant for an arbitrary Lorentz transformation. In fact,
because two reference frames can have a relative acceleration between them,
Lorentz transformations are no longer sufficient. Rather, diffeomorphisms (or
generic coordinate transformations) are now required to map from one ref-
erence frame to another. Meaning that physical quantities are now required
to transform covariantly under diffeomorphims and there is a privileged class
of quantities that are diffeomorphism invariant. The spacetime metric itself
is, itself, not such an invariant and will generally change according to its
position in spacetime but always in just the right way to ensure that scalar
quantities, like proper time, remain diffeomorphism invariant.
And so, rather than saying that special relativity is a weakly gravitating
limit of general relativity, one might be more accurate in claiming that general
relativity comes about by breaking a global symmetry — that of Lorentz-
invariant scalars — into a local (i.e., coordinate-dependent or gauged) sym-
metry — that of diffeomorphism-invariant scalars. From this point of view,
the Minkowski metric is not so much the limiting case for a flat spacetime ge-
ometry but more like the metric whose associated gauge field can be fixed so
as to trivially vanish. As the gauge field holds all the coordinate dependence,
the Minkowski metric maintains a ‘hidden’ dependence on the spacetime co-
ordinates. This dependence has, however, as a matter of choice, simply been
gauged away.
As already mentioned, null cones remain a part of general relativity but
are generally deformed away from their flat-space geometries. An illustration
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of this is provided n Figure 2. Other notions like timelike paths and proper
time are similarly intact but, albeit, more challenging to (respectively) iden-
tify and calculate. However, ordering the configurations of a system into a
Figure 2: A schematic diagram of null cones ‘warped’ by the curvature of
spacetime.
physically significant sequence once again requires the postulation of causal-
ity. This is contrary to the idea that time, as it is experienced in Nature,
emerges from the framework of general relativity as is sometimes claimed.
It can be anticipated that general relativity itself emerges from the funda-
mental theory or, perhaps, from an intermediary thereof (e.g., string theory
[26]). Before further speculating on this possibility and its relevance to the
emergence of time, let us first turn to another, seemingly unrelated series of
physical theories.
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Time in the quantum realm
Although the transition is not well defined, classical Newtonian behavior can
be expected to emerge from quantum mechanics in the limit ~→ 0 . But the
transition of time does appear to go smoothly, as quantum mechanics, like
its Newtonian counterpart, utilizes a global time parameter for the purpose
of ordering the configurations of any given system. In the quantum case,
the necessity for such an external time line can be traced to the theory’s
prohibition on quantum time operators, which applies even as a strict matter
of principle. The argument against a time operator is well known but is still
worth reviewing: Any time operator would necessarily be conjugate to a
energy operator (i.e., a Hamiltonian), as follows from the relation [E][∆t] =
[~] . Now let us suppose that a time operator tˆ does indeed exist. Then
one could construct a unitary operator Uˆ = e± i tˆ dE which acts to translate
states along the energy spectrum, Uˆ |E〉 → |E + dE〉 . Such a translation
could be applied indefinitely, projecting the system into a state of arbitrarily
negative energy and, thus, removing any notion of a stable vacuum state.
Things finally get interesting when the more fundamental theory of quan-
tum fields is brought to the fore. As the synthesis of quantum mechanics and
special relativity, quantum field theory can be expected to limit to quan-
tum mechanics as c → ∞ . Note, though, that this limit, just like the
quantum-to-classical case, lacks a well-defined transition as it would entail
one to (somehow) ‘deactivate’ the so-called second quantization of the field-
less theory. But the takeaway point should be that the description of time in
quantum field theory must mimic the time treatment of special relativity if
the field theory is to maintain its integrity. Meaning that quantum field the-
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ory, just like special relativity and all the others, depends on the postulation
of causality if it is to describe the experience of time.
Relating time across theories
As illustrated in Figure 3 and discussed above, there are two ways to reach
classical Newtonian physics from the more fundamental theories. Impor-
tantly, these are one-way paths; Newtonian mechanics can inherit time from
either pathway, but one cannot go up along one path and then backtrack
down the other in order to connect general relativity to quantum field the-
ory. But this pair could still meet at the opposite end in an even more
fundamental theory, as depicted in the figure. Although this is our expecta-
tion, we will proceed to argue that the two paths depend on the same basic
notion of time, irrespective of whether or not they meet at the ‘top’.
Quantum field theory and general relativity are commonly viewed as dis-
connected entities in ‘theory space’. But yet they both include special rel-
ativity as a limiting case, which opens up the possibility of a hidden con-
nection between the two theories. However, given the usual state of affairs,
this would be a naive connection at best as the two theories provide much
different interpretations of the spacetime metric which special relativity ul-
timately inherits. In the case of general relativity, the metric tensor is a
physical field that describes the geometric and causal structure of spacetime.
And so, from this point of view, the Minkowski metric of special relativity
can be interpreted as the flat-spacetime limit of a physical object.
Meanwhile, the Minkowski metric of quantum field theory is generally
regarded as a mathematical construct and not a real physical object. This
21
Figure 3: Schematic diagram showing direct relations between theories in
physics where ‘?’ stands in place of all the as yet undetermined theories: a
fundamental theory and any intermediary versions thereof.
description falls in line with that of the gauge fields in classical electrodynam-
ics, which seems sensible for a classical theory but somewhat contradictory
for a theory of quantum (gauge) fields. We will argue next that this inter-
pretation of the Minkowski metric is indeed misguided and that, just like in
the flat-spacetime limit of general relativity, this tensor is harboring a hid-
den dependence on the coordinates of spacetime, making it a physically real
field. Note, though, that any such dependence must remain hidden and un-
detectable so as not to jeopardize the requisite Lorentz invariance of quantum
field theory nor the closely related theorem of Weinberg and Witten [27].
Our first argument is undoubtedly the simplest one: Quantum field the-
ories can be expected, on very general grounds, to not have any unbroken
global symmetries [28], and we see no good reason for Lorentz invariance
to be exempt from this ‘policy’ (given that the effects of it breaking remain
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hidden as just discussed). The relevant point here is the inevitable break-
ing of classical symmetries after the theory has been suitably quantized and
renormalized; the so-called quantum anomalies [29].
A second argument comes from string theory, which is also void of global
symmetries [30]. Even if string theory does not accurately depict reality,
it is the only known self-consistent theory which accounts for both general
relativity and quantum field theory and so it can be used as an indicator of
what a more fundamental theory might look like. 11
Our third argument goes as follows: Suppose that there was a more
fundamental theory which contains both general relativity and quantum field
theory. We would then expect all of its observable and emergent features —
including proper time, null cones and, by extension, the metric — to be
subject to the effects of quantum fluctuations. Such fluctuations can not be
prohibited from depending on the coordinates of spacetime.
Let us, finally, recall a standard argument that is routinely used against
global symmetries: One considers particles that are forever lost inside of a
black hole, which implies the breaking of globally conserved quantities such
as the baryon number [32]. Note that the process of black hole evaporation
process cannot resolve this situation because the emitted radiation is domi-
nated by massless particles [33] and any such particle is incapable of carrying
a baryon number.
The two middle arguments imply that there is some intermediary theory
11String theory is certainly more fundamental but we are not asserting that string theory
is the fundamental theory. In fact, we would argue against such a suggestion (see, e.g.,
[31] for a relevant discussion.)
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or, possibly, the fundamental theory itself from which both general relativity
and quantum field theory are emergent (cf, Figure 3). Although not strictly
necessary (as the other two arguments would suffice), this would be the
natural expectation if one accepts our assertion that the two theories do
indeed host similar time treatments. But, to be clear, we are not suggesting
that a recognizable notion of time has to exist in all theories up to and
including the fundamental theory, but only that some ‘blueprint’ for time
is provided at a more fundamental level. This feature will be referred to as
‘elemental time’ later on in the paper.
To summarize, our contention is that all currently accepted theories are
really talking about the same basic notion of time but, by the same token,
all require that causality be postulated.
3 The thermodynamic arrow and the time-
less Universe
Whereas the thermodynamic arrow of time points in the direction of increas-
ing entropy, the closely aligned psychological arrow is taken to represent time
as perceived by a conscious observer recording experiences in her memory.
These arrows are well known but what may not be is that the concept of
a psychological arrow can be extended beyond conscious observers such as
ourselves and even beyond computers. The same idea applies just as well to
any physical system that has changed its configuration as the result of an
irreversible interaction. The point is that any such change can be viewed
as the act of ‘recording information’ in the sense that one configuration (or
24
‘memory’) of the system is erased and replaced by a new one. The con-
straint of irreversibility ensures that the previous configuration can only be
restored with the sacrifice of a new one and accounts for the alignment with
the thermodynamic arrow. The latter because such interactions produce
heat and then, by virtue of the Clausius inequality, increase entropy. What
we intend to show here is that this arrow emerges as a consequence of the
Page–Wootters methodology [20], but only if one also insists on a physically
meaningful notion of time.
The phenomenon of time depends on one’s interpretation of the Universe.
If the Universe is regarded as a totally isolated system, as presumed here,
then the phenomenon of time cannot be imported from the ‘outside’ — it
must rather emerge from within. This isolated model of the Universe is
captured by the Wheeler–DeWitt equation [19],
Hˆ |Ψ〉 = 0 , (1)
where Hˆ is the Hamiltonian constraint from general relativity but elevated
to the role of a quantum operator and |Ψ〉 is the putative wavefunction of
the Universe. As a closed and stable gravitating system, the total energy of
the Universe is zero and unchanging. As such, the Hamiltonian annihilates
all physical states; meaning that the relevant states cannot evolve in time,
eiHˆt |Ψ〉 = 1 |Ψ〉 . The conserved energy and the static nature of the states
should be regarded as a manifestation of the Universe’s isolation and not as
a unique feature of the Wheeler–DeWitt description.
The emergence of time is problematic given that the Universe is prohib-
ited from ‘fetching’ any of its features from its (hypothetical) exterior. It
is useful to compare this situation to that of isolated quantum systems in a
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more conventional setting. In standard quantum mechanics, the difficulty is
overcome simply because the isolated system exists within an environment
that does experience time, and so a notion of time can still be imported
from this exterior region. Not unlike a Russian doll, any isolated system
can be fitted inside a larger one so as to import a notion of time, with the
procedure repeated indefinitely until some largest possible system is reached.
In the case of the isolated Universe, however, one is beginning the iterative
procedure already at this upper maximum.
Let us now move on to the Page–Wootters solution to this conundrum.
Those authors proposed that the Universe be divided into two subsystems
[20]: the clock C and the rest of the Universe R. Here, we will only briefly
summarize the method but have also included a more quantitative description
in Appendix A. One begins by subdividing the Universe in such a way that C
and R are maximally entangled and approximately isolated. The conjugate
operator PˆC to the clock Hamiltonian HˆC = TrRHˆ can than serve as an
effective time operator for R. The reason that this works is because the
approximate isolation ensures that, as far as physical states are concerned,
the respective Hamiltonians are related by HˆR ≈ −HˆC , and so the effective
time parameter for C (namely, the eigenvalue of PˆC) and that for R are
the same up to a sign convention. The condition of maximal entanglement
is itself necessary to ensure that the states of R are indeed correlated with
the eigenvalues of PˆC in a one-to-one way (assuming no degeneracies). Any
interaction effects, which would be governed by a Hamiltonian of the form
HˆI = Hˆ − HˆC − HˆR ≈ 0 , are negligible in this setup and the so-called ideal-
clock limit implies that HˆI vanishes identically. Although this treatment
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suffered criticism from Kuchar [34], the issue has since been resolved by
independent investigations [35, 36].
The Page–Wootters process thus restores the notion of time in the (oth-
erwise) timeless Universe but not necessarily in a useful way. Given that the
clock and its complement are roughly equal in size, dimC ∼ dimR , 12 the
emergent time parameter can only provide a time ordering for R as a whole;
it cannot do so for an arbitrary subsystem of R.
Figure 4: A representation of the Hilbert space of the Universe as used in the
Page-Wootters method with clock system C maximally entangled with the rest
of the Universe R. The left image shows an isolated clock system. The right
image shows a clock which is allowed to interact with an arbitrary subsystem
R′ contained in R.
This point underlying this last claim is illustrated in Figure 4, where one
can see that R has to ‘disperse’ the mutual entanglement throughout a much
larger region of Hilbert space than that occupied by a smaller subsystem,
12The consequences of weakening this assumption are discussed in Appendix B.
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R′  R . That is, R′ can have only partial ‘knowledge’ of the mutual
entanglement since this smaller subsystem is not, by itself, strongly entangled
with C. So that, as far as R′ is concerned, an essential ingredient of the
Page–Wootter’s framework is absent. This appears to limit the utility of their
method to the case of a two-system picture. However, a way of circumventing
this obstacle is still possible.
In some previous investigations [21, 22], we have made the case that C
cannot be completely isolated fromR if it is to efficiently provide a description
of time. This conclusion depended on some specific physical examples, but
the analytic findings are supported by a more general argument: As long as
R′ is continuously interacting with C, its state (or configuration) will remain
correlated with the states of C, which are in turn still correlated with the
eigenvalues of PˆC . Hence, these very same eigenvalues can also serve as the
time parameter for R′.
It is worth augmenting this argument with a particular example (cf, Fig-
ure 4). Let us suppose that the role of the clock is played by the cosmological
expansion of the Universe as often put forth in earlier literature; see, for ex-
ample. [37]. 13 Let us also identify R′ and R′′ as a pair of ‘tiny’ subsystems
of R; namely, the Milky Way and some other galaxy that is close enough for
there to be a mutual attractive force. There are now two possibilities: Either
the gravitational pull between R′ and R′′ is not strong enough to overcome
the expansion of the Universe and the galaxies move apart, or the expan-
sion effect loses out and the two galaxies move toward one another. In both
13We are assuming that there is some mechanism and thus subsystem of the Universal
Hilbert space that is responsible for the expansion.
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scenarios, the resultant interaction between R′ and R′′ is influenced by the
expansion, and so by C. In other words, each galaxy is continually provided
with a record of the expansion or, effectively, with a record of the time . In
this setup, the light emitted from R′′ and captured by R′ (and vice versa) is
what represents the ‘clock readings’.
The expansion of the Universe has recently been adopted as a clock in a
paper by Stupar and Vedral [38]. In that study, and in contrast to ours, the
interaction effects were regarded as negligible to ensure that the clock is ideal
(i.e., a completely isolated system). Although the clock in these examples
is only one of many choices, we would contend that it is the natural one
because, in this case, the clock parameter is literally the cosmological time.
Moreover, this brand of interactions must apply to all systems as a matter
of principle because of the uniquely universal nature of gravity; everything
gravitates!
It is important to emphasize that any interaction between the various
subsystems is associated with the ‘recording of information’ and, thus, with
an accompanying production of heat. Hence, each successive configuration
of the clock, as measured by R′, corresponds to an increase in entropy and
so a thermodynamic arrow of time. The mutual entanglement between C
and R is reduced by these same interactions, and so an arrow pointing in the
direction of decreasing entanglement can be identified as the cosmological
arrow of time. In this way, we anticipate the lining up of all the relevant
arrows of time: cosmological, thermodynamic and psychological. But the
elephant in the room continues to be the need for causality to be postulated.
While it might be argued that the entanglement can be discarded if in-
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teractions are allowed to measure the clock directly, we briefly point out
that removing the entanglement would result in a breakdown of the Page–
Wootters description of time. Let us suppose that |Ψ〉 is a separable, rather
than entangled state of C and R, which would then lead to
|Ψp〉 = αp(e−ipHˆC |φp〉C)⊗ |φp〉R
6= αp |φp〉C ⊗ (eipHˆR |φp〉R) ,
(2)
where p is the eigenvalue of PˆC , αp are coefficients, and |φp〉C , |φp〉R are the
states of C and R respectively. Importantly, there is no intrinsic time that
can be utilized by C in the absence of entanglement. If we consider R as
the clock from C’s perspective, the removal of entanglement translates into a
given state of C being able to ‘pick’ any state of R as its ‘partner’, resulting
in a nonsensical description of time. The interactions would only be able to
recover a meaningful sense of time without entanglement if their strength
could be turned up such that they significantly influence C. This would
negate the weak interaction condition and thus cause a breakdown of the
formalism’s ability to describe time. There is, however, reason to think that
just such a scenario may be realized eventually.
We have previously argued that, although the effects of the interactions
between subsystems may be negligible to begin with, they would apply con-
tinually and eventually reach a point when the ideal-clock limit no longer
makes sense, even as a limiting case [21, 22]. The current situation, however,
does not face such a crisis. As the expansion continues, R′ and R′′ will ei-
ther separate to a large enough distance to render the interactions as truly
negligible or they will merge into a single system for which the expansion
has no influence. Of course, either scenario prevents any further access to
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the states of the clock. Extrapolating this idea to longer and longer scales,
one comes to the realization that, for the inevitable Universal state of maxi-
mum entropy, the requisite interactions would become utterly irrelevant, as
no new information about the state of C could ever be recorded. In other
words, the loss of the clock parameter would occur just when the evolution
of the Universe has finally stagnated.
4 Concluding discussions
The status of time: Our previously stated definition of time, as the po-
tential for change, is distinct from the experience of time. This is because
real physical systems obey a compulsion to change through a particular se-
quence of configurations and not just the potential to do so. Moreover, the
specific order of the sequence plays a role in that it maintains the consistency
of physical laws, which are what determines how to relate one configuration
to the next. Static systems are defined as those existing in a single configu-
ration and so are not functionally dependent on time. This class of systems
can be distinguished from those which are functionally dependent on time
but have no compulsion to change; what we have referred to as being frozen
in time. While it is not outside the norm to see the latter category labeled
as ‘timeless’ (see below), we have argued, much to the contrary, that the
physical existence of systems — even if fixed in this way — still require a
moment of time just like a motionless object requires a position in space. If
this assertion survives under closer scrutiny, theories which claim to remove
time completely may be at a disadvantage.
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The timeless Universe: The timeless description has its roots in the
eternal Universe that was proposed by Parmenides in ancient Greece [7] but
has since become associated with more modern representations. 14
The timeless interpretation of the Wheeler–DeWitt model is similar to
some previous versions, except that it also incorporates the stochastic nature
of quantum mechanics. A conceptual framework for this picture has been laid
out by Barbour [2]. 15 That author presented a view in which there is an
infinite ensemble of distinct frames, each of which includes a collection of
physical systems in a very specific set of configurations. One could view the
ensemble of frames as randomly ‘scattered’ in an infinitely large heap. The
frames might then be ‘lined up’ to form an ordered sequence of configurations
for each physical system. If time is indeed required for physical existence,
then each such frame could still represent a moment of time. If this is indeed
the viewpoint, then it is fully compliant with our notion of a frozen (but not
static) version of the Universe.
Whereas the notion of a moment might survive in this manner, the con-
cept of change cannot. An argument prohibiting change as a real physical
process was presented long ago by McTaggart [39]. Although disagreeing
that the argument applies in general, we find that it works nicely in the con-
text of such timeless descriptions and adapt it accordingly. Let us assume
a time-frozen Universe (as described above) and consider a physical system
with an infinitely large number of different configurations, each of which is
contained in some ‘slice’ of time. The argument points out that all configu-
14See, for example, the discussion on Block-Universe models in Appendix B.4.
15There are other applicable frameworks such as that in [4]. Here, we are trying to
capture the general features which are shared by most of the timeless interpretations.
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rations of the system can claim equal existence in any given slice as there is,
a priori, no rule against this. The way out of this nonsensical scenario would
be to insist that each configuration is constrained to exist in a single frame.
As a result, the identity of the physical system would have to be separated
into ‘parts’, with each of these being an individual physical entity that is
existing, perpetually, in a particular frame with its single configuration. The
physical system, as the sum of these parts, could not experience change in
any objective way, as no single part of it ever transitions into any other. The
conclusion is that any perceived change in a timeless Universe would have to
be illusionary. This would be similar to the way in which individual frames
in a sequence can be used to form the illusion of a moving picture, just like
in twentieth-century animation.
To maintain this illusion of timeless change, the ‘memories’ — or the
records of past interactions — that are present in each frame may be used
to reproduce the specific order of configurations which are observed in Na-
ture. 16 17 But, for any given frame in the sequence, there could only ever be
circumstantial evidence for the existence of (causally) older frames. Indeed,
each individual frame isolates the physical entities within it — along with
their respective records of past interactions — from any and all other frames,
as each member of the ensemble exists independently of the others. Meaning
that such a record cannot, in fact, be attributed to interactions; it can only
16Here, we mean memories (and records as well) in the broadest terms possible. For
instance, a sea-side rock might remember being eroded by the tides.
17Other timeless interpretations focus on the relations between frames to describe an
order, but these would presumably also rely on a record in each frame to account for any
knowledge of other frames.
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be related to the frame that hosts it.
And, if this state of affairs was not already problematic enough, an ex-
planation is still needed to account for the specific order of configurations
which appear in Nature. An advocate for timelessness would require some-
thing like, perhaps, a many-paths approach or an action principle to explain
why the illusion of change (as perceived through the ordering of the frames)
is consistent with the laws of physics. What cannot, however, be relied on
is the notion of causality, as this conceptually breaks down when confronted
with the timeless interpretation.
As pointed out in Section 1.1, causality runs amiss when the labels of
‘cause’ and ‘effect’ can be arbitrarily assigned to either end of a process.
This would be the case in any theory that maintains time-reversal invariance
under all circumstances, which is certainly the case here, and forms part of
Hume’s concern that, in any such process, cause and effect would each be
equally responsible for the other [40]. But, more importantly, without the
notion of objective change, the motivation for connecting one configuration
of a system to any other becomes ad hoc, never mind connecting them is a
causally ordered way. What is needed for this to work would be the inclusion
of an intervening process such as an irreversible interaction. In other words,
maybe change could be an illusion but causality could never be.
Change as a real process: There is a school of thought that real physical
change can be viewed as a process of ‘becoming’, aligning with ideas from [41,
42]. Our results seem to be in support of this viewpoint. For us, irreversible
interactions serve as agents of change, inducing each configuration of a system
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to transition to — or become — the next one in the sequence. This picture
enabled us to recover time as an emergent phenomena, in spite of the isolated
state of the Universe.
The aforementioned argument of McTaggart has been used to prohibit a
description of the Universe as a place of ‘becoming’ due to the inclusion of a
present-time or ‘now’ moment. 18 However, the argument can only apply to
the Parmenides Universe and other timeless versions for which every moment
of time is to be regarded as existing equally (i.e., existing simultaneously and
in perpetuity) [6].
This distinction between ‘timefullness’ and timelessness reinforces the
conclusion above: Treating change as a real process requires one to dismiss
the notion that all moments of time could exist simultaneously. This treat-
ment does, however, necessarily invoke causality if it is to be consistent with
the experience of time in the Universe. While the description of interactions
within a closed system is often said to be incompatible with causality — as
no external influence is available to initiate a causal chain of events — there
are still arguments to the contrary; see, for instance, [45].
On the other hand, adopting the stance that change is an illusion, one
would still require a mechanism that enforces the correct order on a sequence
of configurations. There is then no added cost for postulating causality.
Final thoughts: The recurring theme of this work is that the basic def-
inition of time does not appear to be an issue but the experience of time
remains unexplained. Put differently, the necessity for causality and that it
18The principles of relativity are sometimes used for the same purpose. But there are
arguments that counter such a claim. See, for example, [15, 43, 44].
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must be put in by hand is what appears to be the real ‘problem of time’.
The notion that time in quantum mechanics and time in general relativity
are unrelated might be misleading given the expectation of an underlying
fundamental theory. As explained earlier, the quantum and relativistic time
treatments could plausibly be interpreted as emerging from the same source.
Under this interpretation, it would not matter that the two treatments appear
different, as their respective theories have different domains of applicability
— except at the very scales where a more fundamental theory needs to be
considered.
We have also proposed a means by which the experience of time can
emerge by way of the Page–Wootters framework for clocks in an isolated
Universe. The key new element in our proposal is the role played by irre-
versible interactions; not that their inclusion is in any way novel but, rather,
that their importance in the framework has been under appreciated. It is this
class of interactions that leads to the recovery of a Universal arrow of time;
meaning that any system’s sequence of configurations will naturally line up
with the thermodynamic and psychological arrows, and can even align with
the cosmological arrow if the expansion of the Universe adopts the role of
the clock. (To be clear, it is the entanglement between the clock and the
remainder which ensures that all systems see the same set of arrows.) Our
proposal is also indicative of a natural connection between gravity, as per
the cosmological expansion, and entropy, through the associated recording
of information. Although highly speculative, we are tempted to suggest that
this is yet another manifestation of the close-knit relation between gravity
and entropy that has become ubiquitous in the high-energy literature. For
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instance, Jacobson’s derivation of Einstein’s equations via the first law of
thermodynamics [46], the link between entanglement entropy and null sur-
faces [47] that follows from the gauge–gravity duality [48] and the recent
recovery of the second law in the same holographic framework [49].
If we can establish the above interpretation of time, then what still re-
mains? Once again, all such queries lead to the conspicuously absent expla-
nation for causality. Without this fundamental principle, one cannot describe
any process of change in Nature. Then, insofar as all sensible treatments of
time are reliant on the concept of causal order, we would like to suggest that
the problem of time be restated as the ‘problem of causality’. By removing
the clutter from the discussion, our hope is that the understanding of time
can advance just like time inevitably does itself.
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A Page and Wootters
Section 3 introduced a timeless model of the Universe, as expressed by a
pure state |Ψ〉, along with a Hamiltonian Hˆ. To recover time in this setup,
one can — following Page and Wootters [20] — partition the Universe into a
clock C and the rest R, which are governed by Hamiltonians HˆC = TrRHˆ
and HˆR = TrCHˆ respectively. The conjugate to the clock Hamiltonian PˆC ,
as defined by [HˆC , PˆC ] = i (with ~ = 1), plays a key role. Suppose that
PˆC |p〉 = p |p〉 and that p is a continuous variable (at least for all practical
purposes). Then p can serve as the ‘evolution parameter’ whose associated
evolution operator is UC = e
iHˆCp
C .
In order for the parameter p to serve as ‘time’ for both C and R, their
respective states should be maximally entangled; that is,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
p
αp |p〉 |φp〉 , (3)
where |φp〉 represents the states of R (in terms of a suitable basis) and αp
represents complex coefficients.
Given that the Hamiltonian for the entire Universe vanishes, we have
Hˆ = HˆC⊗1+1⊗HˆR+HˆI , where HˆI governs any interaction effects between
C and R. If HˆI can be considered negligible, then Hˆ ≈ HˆC⊗1+1⊗HˆR = 0 ,
which leads to the relation
HˆC ≈ −HˆR . (4)
This quasi-equality makes it clear that states of C are correlated with those
of R in such a way that p describes the evolution of both.
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B Objections to the interacting clock solu-
tion
B.1 The clock ambiguity
The clock ambiguity has been one of the main criticisms against the Page–
Wootters method [23]. Of particular interest to us is not only the ambiguity
itself but a recently proposed resolution that is based on using an isolated
clock system [50]. Because of our emphasis on the interactions between the
clock and the rest of the Universe, we would like to propose a resolution that
does not depend on isolating the clock.
The clock ambiguity is just as the name suggests: There are a multitude
of ways, practically an infinite number, to partition the Universe into a clock
C and the rest R. It is then safe to say that that different partitions would
generally lead to different time parameters, as each choice of clock system
will have its own unique succession of states. This is simply not an acceptable
state of affairs for an emergent notion of time.
The choice of fully isolated subsystems does appear to circumvent this
difficulty because, as made clear in [50], any such partition is related to all
others via a unitary transformation. However, as shown in the main text of
the current treatment, an interacting clock is an essential ingredient for the
Page–Wootters framework to make sense. But, on the other hand, treating
the isolated clock as a limiting case of a more general situation, one might
may be tempted to argue that the two views are consistent provided that the
interactions are small enough. The problem with this argument is that the
effects of the interactions would accumulate and would have to be taken into
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account eventually; see Section 3 and also [21, 22]. However, the problem
with our counterargument is that the clock ambiguity must once again be
confronted.
Yet, in the framework of our discussion, any ambiguity in the choice of
clock is really besides the point. This is because there is no ambiguity in the
arrow of time that emerges by way of ‘recording’ the interactions, and this
arrow naturally aligns with that of thermodynamics, which certainly has no
ambiguity in its meaning of time. We would then propose that the key to
resolving the clock ambiguity is to make sure that one’s choice of clock is not
isolated.
B.2 Size discrepancies and the large clock resolution
Let us first note that one can expect, on generic grounds, that dimC ∼
dimR simply because of the condition of maximal entanglement. The same
reasoning would imply that the two subsystems must basically agree on most
measurable properties (such as the magnitude of each one’s energy), as max-
imal entanglement literally means that complete knowledge of one system
provides one with complete knowledge of the other. But let us suppose that
the dimensionalities do indeed differ. We can immediately discount a scenario
like dimC  dimR because any one configuration of the clock would then
correspond to a multitude of different R states, thus inhibiting the evolution
of R. But what about the opposite situation? More importantly, could one
use the notion of a large clock to eliminate the need for interactions?
To address the second query, it is useful to recall from Section 3 that
isolated clocks can only provide a sense of time for a two-system Universe.
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The basic point is that, given a clock C, the remainder of the Universe R and
any parametrically small subsystem R′ of R, then R′ cannot have sufficient
‘knowledge’ of the entanglement between the clock and its complement. On
the other hand, if R′ is of the same order in size as R, then there are still
only two (or perhaps three) subsystems that are able to experience time.
It might appear that this problem can be avoided by taking C to be very
large, dimC  dimR , so that any other subsystem in the Universe could
be as entangled as much with the clock system as it could ever be. But this
would not work because each subsystem would then ‘see’ a different sequence
of clock configurations and, therefore, would have its own distinct notion of
time. For isolated subsystems this would indeed be the case — but not if
the interactions between the subsystems are restored to provide them with
a universally agreed upon thermodynamic arrow of time. And so, although
the case of dimC  dimR cannot be ruled out, it has no obvious selling
points and seems rather unnatural.
B.3 The multiverse and parallel universes
We have, by intention, been restricting considerations to the case for which
the Universe is in isolation. If one is invested in models with a large number of
parallel universes and/or the now popular multiverse framework, then these
external ‘verses’ would have to be precluded from influencing the Universe in
question. Alternatively, should one or more of these external verses be shown
to influence the Universe of interest, then the boundary of the system could
be extended to include the influencing systems. Only an infinite number
of such influencers would then produce any significant obstruction to our
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discussion.
B.4 The Block Universe
The so-called Block Universe is not too far removed from the timeless models
of the Universe which were considered, and then mostly dismissed, in Sec-
tion 4. Nevertheless, there is enough of a distinction to warrant a separate
comment.
There are actually many variants of Block Universe (see, e.g., [6], for a
summary), but any of these describe the same basic picture: A determinis-
tic reality in which all ‘moments of time’ can be viewed as spacelike slices,
with each one stacked on another to form a never-changing four-dimensional
‘block’ of spacetime. There is no possibility of distinguishing between past,
present and future, as all such slices are meant to be equal in status. Conse-
quently, any experience of time or any description of a transitory ‘now’ mo-
ment should be regarded as an illusion. 19 As the concept of time becomes
trivialized, there is indeed a sense of timelessness for these models. This
timelessness is, however, different from that of our frozen Universe because
the former cannot incorporate causality — its inclusion would inevitably re-
quire one to treat change as a real physical process. This point is elaborated
on in Section 4.
19The same idea is also described by McTaggart’s B-series of time [39].
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